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Abstract
The paper considers several definitions of information flow security for
intransitive policies from the point of view of the complexity of verify-
ing whether a finite-state system is secure. The results are as follows.
Checking (i) P-security (Goguen and Meseguer), (ii) IP-security (Haigh
and Young), and (iii) TA-security (van der Meyden) are all in PTIME,
while checking TO-security (van der Meyden) is undecidable, as is check-
ing ITO-security (van der Meyden). The most important ingredients in
the proofs of the PTIME upper bounds are new characterizations of
the respective security notions, which also lead to new unwinding proof
techniques that are shown to be sound and complete for these notions
of security, and enable the algorithms to return simple counter-examples
demonstrating insecurity. Our results for IP-security improve a previous
doubly exponential bound of Hadj-Alouane et al.
Keywords: noninterference, information flow, verification
∗This paper extends and significantly revises the paper [1]. The main differences are that
full proofs of results from [1] are provided, new results concerning the notion of ITO-security
are added, new results on unwindings for IP-security and TA-security are added, and these
new unwindings are used as the basis for new algorithms that yield better complexity bounds
than presented in [1].
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1 Introduction
One of the fundamental methods in the construction of secure systems to high
levels of assurance is to decompose the system into trusted and untrusted com-
ponents, arranged in an architecture that constrains the possible causal effects
and flows of information between these components. On the other hand, re-
source limitations and cost constraints may make it desirable for trusted and
untrusted components to share resources. For example, it is cheaper for an intel-
ligence analyst to handle high security and low security information on a single
desktop machine than to use two physically separated machines. This leads to
complex systems designs and implementations, in which the desired constraints
on flows of information between trusted and untrusted components need to be
enforced in spite of the fact that these components share resources. In order to
provide high levels of assurance of implementations of this kind, it is desirable
to have a formal theory of systems architecture and information flow, so that a
design or implementation may be formally verified to conform to an information
flow policy. Moreover, one would like, whenever possible, to automate the ver-
ification that a system satisfies such a formally defined policy. This motivates
the problems we consider in this paper. We study the complexity of verifica-
tion of a range of formally defined security policies that specify how a system
is architecturally structured in terms of how information may flow between its
components.
Attack model: The problems we consider in this paper address systems
implementation attacks. We work in the paradigm of information flow secu-
rity, where it is assumed that a (passive) adversary may attack the system by
attempting to make subtle deductions from her possible observations of the sys-
tem, exploiting covert channels that may exist in the system, in order to learn
secrets that she is not authorized to possess. The automated analyses we con-
sider aim to provide assurance that the system has been designed in such a
way that such attacks are not possible, or to discover such attacks when they
exist. The analysis can be applied both in circumstances where it is feared that
a rogue systems developer may have deliberately constructed the system so as
to contain such prohibited flows of information, as well as to ensure that such
flows of information have not been inadvertently allowed to exist.
Policy model: Notions of noninterference—a first definition was given by
Goguen and Meseguer [2]—are one approach to the formalisation of informa-
tion flow and causal relationships. Noninterference was first proposed in the
context of transitive information flow policies (with transitivity following from
the partial order on security domains) but it was subsequently noted [3] that
systems architectures often require intransitive policies. For example, a common
architectural pattern is to restrict information flow from a high-level domain to
a low-level domain so as to be possible only via a trusted downgrader (e. g., a
declassification guard or encryption device). This pattern motivates an intransi-
tive information flow policy, stating that information flow is permitted from the
high-level domain to the downgrader and from the downgrader to the low-level
domain, but not directly from the high-level domain to the low-level domain.
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Goguen and Meseguer’s definition of noninterference, based on a “purge”
function, does not yield the desired conclusions for intransitive policies. Haigh
and Young proposed a variant (that we refer to as IP-security) for intransitive
policies based on an “intransitive purge” function. Rushby [4] later refined their
theory and developed connections to access control systems. Van der Meyden
[5] has argued that the definitions of security for intransitive policies in these
works suffer from some subtle flaws, and proposed some improved definitions,
TA-security, TO-security and ITO-security, that first build an operational (full
information protocol) model of the maximal permitted information flow in the
system, and then compares the actual information flow to this maximal permit-
ted information flow. The revised definitions can be shown to avoid the subtle
flaws in the intransitive purge-based definition, and lead to a more satisfactory
proof theory and connection to access control systems than in Rushby’s work
(e.g., yielding both soundness and completeness results, whereas Rushby proved
only soundness.)
Verification: The goal of high assurance systems development by formal
verification motivates the investigation of techniques whereby a systems design
or implementation can be formally shown to satisfy a formal definition of secu-
rity. The technique of unwinding relations [6, 4] provides a proof method that
has been applied to establish that a system satisfies noninterference properties,
but it requires significant human ingenuity to define an unwinding relation that
forms the basis for the proof, and typically also has involved manual driving
(proof rule selection) of the theorem proving tool within which the proof is
conducted.
A better alternative, more acceptable to engineers when it can be applied,
is for the property to be verified by fully automatic techniques. There is a
substantial body of work on automated verification techniques for transitive
noninterference properties (which we discuss in Section 6), but there has been
significantly less work on automated verification techniques for intransitive non-
interference properties.
Contributions: Our contribution in this paper is to provide a basis for
automated verification of definitions of intransitive noninterference, by devel-
oping a characterization of the computational complexity of deciding whether
a given finite-state system is secure with respect to an intransitive information
flow policy according to this definition. In particular, we consider Goguen and
Meseguer’s purge-based definition, IP-security, and van der Meyden’s defini-
tions of TA-security, TO-security and ITO-security. We show that the last two
of these definitions are undecidable, but the others are decidable in polynomial
time and even in nondeterministic logarithmic space. We give algorithms for
the decidable cases and analyse their complexity. Our results are based on new
characterizations of IP-security and TA-security. Using these new characteri-
zations, we develop new notions of unwinding for IP-security and TA-security,
that give sound and complete proof techniques, and yield polynomial time deci-
sion procedures for these two notions. Our PTIME decision procedures exploit
the new notions of unwinding. These new notions of unwinding are also of in-
dependent interest, in that they apply not just to the finite state case, where
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we give the complexity bounds, but also to infinite state systems, where they
can form the basis for proof theoretic verification methods.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define the formal
systems model that we work with, and recall the formal definitions of security for
intransitive information flow policies that we study. New characterizations of IP-
security and van der Meyden’s notion of TA-security are presented in Section 3.
The new unwinding relations for IP-security and TA-security are developed in
Section 4. Section 5 gives the complexity results for all the security notions that
we consider. Our results are positioned within the literature in Section 6, where
we discuss related work. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of open problems
and future research directions. A reduction that deduces the undecidability of
ITO-security from the undecidability of TO-security is presented in an appendix.
2 Basic Definitions and Notation
In this section, we introduce intransitive information flow policies and describe
their motivation. We present a deterministic asynchronous systems model in
which such policies may be interpreted, and then recall a number of different
semantic interpretations of such policies in this system model that have been
proposed in the literature.
2.1 Noninterference Policies
Noninterference policies are reflexive relations  ⊆ D × D, where D is a set
of “domains”. The intuitive reading of u  v is that “actions of domain u
are permitted to interfere with domain v”, or “information is permitted to flow
from domain u to domain v”. For any set U ⊆ D the image of U , denoted U,
is defined by U = {v ∈ D | ∃u ∈ U : u v}. For a singleton set {u} we also
write u instead of {u}.
The reason for the assumption of reflexivity is that, intuitively, a domain
should be allowed to interfere with or have information about itself, since this
cannot usually be prevented. In early work on noninterference [2], the relation
 is also assumed to be transitive. This follows from the interpretation of
domains as corresponding to security levels associated to classes of information
and access rights, which have generally been taken to be partially ordered [7].
(In the classical multi-level security models, this partial order is derived from a
linear order on security levels and the set containment order on sets of labels.)
One of the motivations for the consideration of policies  that are not tran-
sitive is that classical multilevel security policies are too restrictive for practical
purposes, allowing flow of information from lower security levels to higher se-
curity levels, but prohibiting flow in the opposite direction. Such flows may be
less frequent but are nevertheless required, e.g., for distribution of battle plans,
in response to freedom of information requests, or for transmission of encrypted
content across an insecure network. One of the ways this has been handled is
to allow the general policy to be violated by a special downgrader component.
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Figure 1: Downgrader Policy
A typical downgrader policy is depicted in Figure 1. Here the usual (transitive)
multi-level policy for domains Public, Secret and Top-Secret is extended by the
addition of two domains DownS and DownP, that are responsible for down-
grading of information from Top-Secret to Secret, and from Secret to Public,
respectively. These domains are trusted to enforce whatever policy constraints
apply to the downgrading of information. Note that it would not be appropriate
to apply an assumption of transitivity on this setting, since then, e.g., the edges
involving DownS would imply that Top-Secret  Secret, i.e., a direct flow of
information from Top-Secret to Secret is permitted.
Subsequent work on intransitive noninterference has taken a somewhat ex-
tended interpretation of the term “domain,” treating this more as akin to “com-
ponent” in a systems architecture. Figure 2 shows a systems architecture, dis-
cussed in [4] and [8], for a system in which messages are sent from a high security
(Red) domain through a low security (Black) domain, with the global security
policy stating that all content, except the message header, must be encrypted,
and uncontrolled flow of information from Red to Black is prohibited. The ar-
chitecture proposes to achieve this goal by having the Bypass component check a
(more detailed) policy on the allowed header structure and content, and by hav-
ing the Crypto component enforce a local policy stating that all output must
be encrypted. These flows are recomposed into the encrypted message (with
header) at the Black component. Crypto and Bypass are assumed to be trusted
components of low enough complexity that they can be verified to enforce their
local policies. Red (which may contain Trojans) and Black (which is at a low
security level) are not assumed to be trusted. The argument for security of
the system is intended to follow from the structure of the information flows
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Figure 2: Policy for Encrypted Message Transmission
High-in High-out
Low-in Low-out
Figure 3: A MILS Design Level Policy
in the architecture, plus the assumption that the trusted components correctly
implement their local policies.
MILS security, as expounded in [8], proposes to base development of cer-
tifiably secure systems on design level arguments of this type, together with
implementations in which mechanisms such as separation kernels or periods
processing are used to enforce the systems architecture. We refer to [8] for a
more detailed discussion of MILS security and the proposed structure of the
argument for security of the system in Figure 2.
We note that intransitive information flow policies are intended to express
just the architectural structure of information flow, rather than encompass all
the details of security policy. One key point is that implementations may involve
resource sharing, which may mean that it is not immediately apparent that the
design level architecture is enforced in the implementation.
For example, Figure 3 illustrates a design level policy for a system with
multiple independent security levels that could be implemented, as shown in
Figure 4, by a trusted multiplexer component that handles information from
multiple security levels. One of the issues in the verification of such systems is
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Figure 4: A MILS Resource Sharing Implementation
to determine whether such a resource sharing implementation correctly enforces
the design level architecture. The definitions in the following sections provide
a number of distinct semantic interpretations of information flow policies that
have been proposed to formalize what it means to implement the notion of
correct enforcement.
2.2 State-Observed Machine Model
Several different types of semantic models have been used in the literature on
noninterference. (See [9] for a comparison and a discussion of their relation-
ships.) We work here with the state-observed machine model used by Rushby [4],
but similar results would be obtained for other models.
This model consists of deterministic machines of the form 〈S, s0, A, step, obs,
dom〉, where S is a set of states, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, A is a set of ac-
tions, dom : A → D associates each action with an element of the set D of
security domains, step : S × A → S is a deterministic transition function, and
obs : S×D → O maps states to an observation in some set O, for each security
domain. We may also refer to security domains more succinctly as “agents”. We
write s · α for the state reached by performing the sequence of actions α ∈ A∗
from state s, defined inductively by s ·  = s, and s · αa = step(s · α, a) for
α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A. Here,  denotes the empty sequence. For any string α, we
say a symbol a occurs in α if α = βaβ′ for some strings β, β′. We define alph(α)
as the set of all symbols occurring in α.
2.3 The Purge Function
Noninterference is given a formal semantics in the transitive case [2] using a
definition based on a “purge” function. Given a set E ⊆ D of domains and a
sequence α ∈ A∗, we write αE for the subsequence of all actions a in α with
dom(a) ∈ E. Given a policy , we define the function purge : A∗×D → A∗ by
purge(α, u) = α{v ∈ D | v u}.
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Figure 5: A system that is TO-secure but not P-secure
(For clarity, we may use subscripting of agent arguments of functions, writing,
e. g., purge(α, u) as purgeu(α).) The system M is said to be secure with respect
to the transitive policy , when, for all α ∈ A∗ and domains u ∈ D, we have
obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · purgeu(α)). That is, each agent’s observations are
as if only interfering actions had been performed. An equivalent formulation
(which we state more generally for policies that are not necessarily transitive,
in anticipation of later discussion) is the following:
Definition 1 (P-security) A system M is P-secure with respect to a policy
 if for all sequences α, α′ ∈ A∗ such that purgeu(α) = purgeu(α′), we have
obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · α′).
This can be understood as saying that agent u’s observation depends only
on the sequence of interfering actions that have been performed.
2.4 The Intransitive Purge Function
While P-security is a reasonable definition of security for transitive information
flow policies, it works less well for intransitive policies. Figure 5 illustrates a
system that is, intuitively, secure for the downgrader policy H  D L, but
which does not satisfy P-security. Here h, d, l are actions of domains H,D,L,
respectively, and the observations in each domain are depicted below the states.
Intuitively, the observations convey a single bit of information: “has H ever
performed the action h?”. Domains H and D learn that H has performed h
as soon as this action is performed (by their observations turning to value 1),
but L does not learn this until after D subsequently performs the downgrading
action d. Since the policy permits D to transmit information about H, the
system is secure. However, this system does not satisfy P-security, since we
have purgeL(hdl) = dl = purgeL(dl) but obsL(s0 · hdl) = 1 6= 0 = obsL(s0 ·
purgeL(dl)). Intuitively, P-security says that L observations depend only on
whatD and L actions have been performed, so cannot contain information about
H, even though the policy, intuitively, permits D to transmit such information.
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To address this deficiency, Haigh and Young [3] generalized the definition of
the purge function to intransitive policies. Intuitively, the intransitive purge of
a sequence of actions with respect to a domain u is the largest subsequence of
actions that could form part of a causal chain of effects (permitted by the policy)
ending with an effect on domain u. More formally (we follow the presentation
from [4]), the definition makes use of a function sources : A∗ × D → P(D)
defined inductively by sources(, u) = {u} and, for a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗, if there
exists v ∈ sources(α, u) with dom(a)  v, then
sources(aα, u) = sources(α, u) ∪ {dom(a)} ,
and else
sources(aα, u) = sources(α, u) .
Intuitively, sources(α, u) is the set of domains v such that there exists a se-
quence of permitted interferences from v to u within α. The intransitive purge
function ipurge : A∗ ×D → A∗ is then defined inductively by ipurge(, u) = 
and, for a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗, if dom(a) ∈ sources(aα, u), then
ipurge(aα, u) = a ipurge(α, u) ,
and else
ipurge(aα, u) = ipurge(α, u) .
The intransitive purge function is then used in place of the purge function
in Haigh and Young’s definition:
Definition 2 (IP-security) A system M is IP-secure with respect to a (pos-
sibly intransitive) policy  if for all sequences α ∈ A∗, and u ∈ D, we have
obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · ipurgeu(α)).
Since the function ipurgeu on A
∗ is idempotent, this definition, like the
definition for the transitive case, can be formulated as: M is IP-secure with
respect to a policy  if for all u ∈ D and all sequences α, α′ ∈ A∗ with
ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(α
′), we have obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 ·α′). It can be seen
that ipurgeu(α) = purgeu(α) when  is transitive, so IP-security is in fact a
generalisation of the definition of security for transitive policies.
2.5 The ta Function
It has been noted by van der Meyden [5] that IP-security classifies some systems
as secure where there is, intuitively, an insecure flow of information that relates
to a domain learning ordering information about the actions of other domains
that it should not have.
Figure 6 depicts part of a system M and a policy  such that M is IP-se-
cure, but for which the conclusion that the system is secure is questionable. We
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Figure 6: A system that is IP-secure but not TA-secure
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sketch the argument for this here, and refer the reader to [5] for a more rigorous
presentation. Intuitively, the system is comprised of two High security level
domains H1, H2, each with a downgrader (D1, D2, respectively) to the Low
security domains L. The actions h1, h2, d1, d2 are associated to the domains
H1, H2, D1, D2, respectively, and state transitions are depicted only when there
is a change of state. The observations of L are depicted at two of the states; at
all other states we assume that L makes observation 0. All other agents may
be assumed to make observation 0 at all states. Intutively, at the state where
L observes 1, it is possible for L to deduce that there has been an occurrence of
h1 followed by an occurrence of h2; the state where L observes 2, it is possible
for L to deduce that these actions have occurred in the opposite order.
We show that this system is IP-secure: Suppose we have ipurgeL(α) =
ipurgeL(β), and one of obsL(s0 · α) or obsL(s0 · β) is 1 or 2, say the former
is equal to 1. Then this sequence must contain an occurrence of h1 before
an occurrence of h2, and each is followed by d1 and d2, respectively. This
observation shows, in fact, that L knows the order of the first h1 and h2 actions
in the sequence α. Because ipurgeL preserves h1 when it is followed by d1, and
similarly for h2 and d2, and also preserves the order of actions that it retains,
the same statement must hold for β, and it then follows that also obsL(s0 ·β) =
1 = obsL(s0 · α). If neither observation is in 1, 2, then both are equal to 0, and
again we have the required equality of observations.
On the other hand, the conclusion that the system is secure is somewhat
peculiar. Each of the downgraders is individually permitted by the policy to
know only about activity in its associated High level domain, and its own ac-
tivity. Thus, individually, neither D1 nor D2 can know the order of the first
two H1 and H2 actions. Moreover, since the system is asynchronous, even if
we were to combine all the information that the downgraders are permitted to
know, we would still not be able to deduce the order on the H1, H2 actions.
We therefore have the peculiar conclusion that the system is classified by IP-
security to be secure, but it allows L to learn information that would not be
permitted to be known to the two domains D1, D2, which are supposed to filter
all flow of information from H1, H2, even if these domains were to combine
their information.
To address this peculiarity, van der Meyden has proposed some other in-
terpretations of intransitive policies. Both proceed by first defining a concrete
operational model of the maximal amount of information that an agent is per-
mitted to have after some sequence of actions has been performed. Security
of the system is then defined by requiring that an agent’s observation may not
contain more than this maximal amount of information.
In the first operational model, when an agent performs an action, it transmits
what it is permitted to know to other agents, subject to constraints in the policy.
The following definition expresses this in a weaker way than the ipurge function.
Given sets X and A, let the set T (X,A) be the smallest set containing X and
such that if x, y ∈ T and z ∈ A then (x, y, z) ∈ T . Intuitively, the elements of
T (X,A) are binary trees with leaves labelled from X and interior nodes labelled
from A.
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Figure 7: A system that is TA-secure but neither TO-secure not ITO-secure
Given a policy , define, for each agent u ∈ D, the function tau : A∗ →
T ({}, A) inductively by tau() = , and, for α ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A,
tau(αa) =
{
tau(α) if dom(a) 6 u,
(tau(α), tadom(a)(α), a) otherwise.
Intuitively, tau(α) captures the maximal information that agent u may, consis-
tently with the policy , have about the past actions of other agents. Initially,
an agent has no information about what actions have been performed. The re-
cursive clause describes how the maximal information tau(α) permitted to flow
to u after the performance of α changes when the next action a is performed.
If a may not interfere with u, then there is no change, otherwise, u’s maximal
permitted information is increased by adding the maximal information permit-
ted to dom(a) at the time a is performed (represented by tadom(a)(α)), as well
the fact that a has been performed. Thus, this definition captures the intuition
that an agent may only transmit information that it is permitted to have, and
then only to agents with which it is permitted to interfere.
Definition 3 (TA-security) A system M is TA-secure with respect to a policy
 if for all agents u and all α, α′ ∈ A∗ such that tau(α) = tau(α′), we have
obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · α′).
Intuitively, this says that each agent’s observations provide the agent with no
more than the maximal amount of information that may have been transmitted
to it, as expressed by the functions ta.
2.6 The to Function
In the definition of TA-security, the operational model of information flow given
by the function ta permits a domain to transmit information that it may have,
even if it has never observed anything from which it could deduce that informa-
tion. Arguably, this is too liberal.
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Figure 7 shows a system for the downgrader policy H  D  L, similar
to that in Figure 5. It can be argued that the system is TA-secure; we leave
the details to the reader. Again, when L observes 1, it can deduce that H has
performed the action h, and indeed, this observation can only occur after D
has performed the action d, thereby downgrading the information about H. On
the other hand, note that in this system, D’s observation is always 0, so D
cannot know, on the basis of its observations, whether H has performed h. D
is therefore transmitting to L information that it does not itself have.
Van der Meyden [5] therefore also considers a variant operational model in
which a domain transmits only what it has actually observed. This yields the
alternate notion of TO-security.
The sequence of all observations and actions of a domain is denoted as its
view. Formally, the notion of view is defined as follows. The definition uses an
absorptive concatenation function ◦, defined over a set X by s ◦ x = s if x is
equal to the final element of s (if any), and s◦x = s ·x (ordinary concatenation)
otherwise, for every s ∈ X∗ and x ∈ X. Define the view of domain u with
respect to a sequence α ∈ A∗ using the function viewu : A∗ → (A ∪O)∗ (where
O is the set of observations in the system) defined by
viewu() = obsu(s0), and
viewu(αa) = (viewu(α) · b) ◦ obsu(s0 · α) ,
where b = a if dom(a) = u and b =  otherwise. That is, viewu(α) is the
sequence of all observations and actions of domain u in the run generated by α,
compressed by the elimination of stuttering observations. Intuitively, viewu(α)
is the complete record of information available to agent u in the run generated
by the sequence of actions α. The reason we apply the absorptive concatenation
is to capture that the system is asynchronous, with agents not having access
to a global clock. The effect of this operation is to reduce any stuttering of an
observation in the run to a single copy. Thus, two sequences that only differ
from each other in repetitions of a single observation are not distinguishable by
the agent.
Given a policy , for each domain u ∈ D, define the function tou : A∗ →
T ((A ∪O)∗, A) by tou() = obsu(s0) and
tou(αa) =
{
tou(α) if dom(a) 6 u,
(tou(α), viewdom(a)(α), a) otherwise.
Intuitively, this definition takes the model of the maximal information that an
action a may transmit after the sequence α to be the fact that a has occurred,
together with the information that dom(a) actually has, as represented by its
view viewdom(a)(α). By contrast, TA-security uses in place of this the maximal
information that dom(a) may have. We may now base the definition of security
on the function to rather than ta.
Definition 4 (TO-security) The system M is TO-secure with respect to 
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if for all domains u ∈ D and all α, α′ ∈ A∗ with tou(α) = tou(α′), we have
obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · α′).
It is possible to give a flatter representation of the information in tou(α)
that clarifies the relationship of this definition to P-security. Define the possibly
transmitted view of domain u for a sequence of actions α to be the largest prefix
tviewu(α) of viewu(α) that ends in an action a with dom(a) = u. Then we have
the following result, which intuitively says that u’s observations depend only on
(1) the parts of the views of other agents which are permitted to pass information
to u that they have actually acted to transmit, and (2) u’s knowledge of the
ordering of its own actions and the actions of these other agents.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of TO-security [5]) The system M is TO-se-
cure with respect to a policy  iff for all sequences α, α′ ∈ A∗, and domains
u ∈ D, if purgeu(α) = purgeu(α′) and tviewv(α) = tviewv(α′) for all domains
v 6= u such that v u, then obsu(s0 · α) = obsu(s0 · α′).
2.7 The ito Function
In order to compare with a definition of Roscoe and Goldsmith [10], van der
Meyden has also introduced a variant of TO-security called ITO-security, in
which information is transmitted slightly faster. We also consider this notion
here since our complexity results bear on algorithmic claims of Roscoe and
Goldsmith.
Given a policy , for each domain u ∈ D, define the function itou : A∗ →
T (O(A ∪O)∗, A) by itou() = obsu(s0) and
itou(αa) =
 itou(α) if dom(a) 6 u,(itou(α), viewdom(a)(α), a) if dom(a) = u,
(itou(α), viewdom(a)(αa), a) otherwise.
This definition is just like that of to, with the difference that the informa-
tion that may be transmitted to u by an action a such that dom(a)  u but
dom(a) 6= u, includes the observation obsdom(a)(s0·αa) obtained in domain dom(a)
immediately after the occurrence of action a. Intuitively, the definition of se-
curity based on this notion will allow that the action a transmits not just the
information observable to dom(a) at the time that it is invoked, but also the new
information that it computes and makes observable in dom(a). This information
is not included in the value itodom(a)(αa) itself, since the definition of security
will state that the new observation may depend only on this value. The nomen-
clature in this case is intended to be suggestive of immediate transmission of
information about observations.
The following definition follows the pattern of the others, but based is on
the functions ito.
Definition 5 The system M is ITO-secure with respect to  if for all domains
u ∈ D and all α, α′ ∈ A∗ with itou(α) = itou(α′), we have obsu(s0 · α) =
obsu(s0 · α′).
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Figure 8: A system that is ITO-secure but not TO-secure
Figure 8 gives an example of a system, for the downgrader policy H  D
L, that is ITO-secure, but not TO-secure. Intuitively, in the action sequence
hd, the downgrader learns that h has been performed (by making observation 1)
from the observation that it makes after performing the action d. ITO-security
permits that the information in this observation is transmitted to L by the
action d, whereas TO-security does not.
The definitions introduced above are shown in [5] to be related as follows:
P-security implies TO-security implies ITO-security implies TA-security implies
IP-security. The converse of each of these implications does not hold: Figures 5-
8 provide counter-examples. In the special case of transitive policies, all these
notions are equivalent.
3 Characterization of IP-security and TA-security
In this section, we develop new characterizations of IP-security and TA-security,
that enable the new unwindings and decision procedures for these notions of
security.
3.1 Characterization of IP-security
We present a new characterization of IP-security. This characterization is the
main tool for our later algorithm that verifies IP-security in polynomial time.
Intuitively, the ipurge function that defines IP-security removes actions that
should be irrelevant for the domain u from its “visible trace.” This leads us
to the definition of the relation →irru : for u ∈ D and α, α′ ∈ A∗, we define
α →irru α′ if ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(α′) and there exist β, β′ ∈ A∗, and a ∈ A
such that α = βaβ′ and α′ = ββ′. That is, α →irru α′ if α′ is obtained from
α by removing a single action that is “irrelevant” in the sense that (according
to the information flow allowed by the policy) u should not be able to observe
whether the removed action has occurred at all. The symmetric closure of →irr
is denoted with ↔irr.
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Note that if ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(α
′), then there exists a sequence α =
α0 ↔irr α1 ↔irr . . . ↔irr αn = α′. If obsu(s0 · α) 6= obsu(s0 · α′), then we
must have obsu(s0 · αk) 6= obsu(s0 · αk+1) for some k. Thus, directly from
the definition of IP-security, we obtain that a system is IP-insecure iff there
exists a domain u ∈ D, a reachable state q ∈ S, a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ such
that ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α) and obsu(q · aα) 6= obsu(q · α). We now
state a lemma that shows that we can put some restrictions on α. The lemma
shows that if a system is not IP-secure, then an α and a as above exist such
that additionally, α does not contain any action c whose domain dom(c) can be
influenced by dom(a). This allows us to reduce the search space for a witness of
insecurity significantly when designing our algorithms.
In the following, we will always assume that every state s ∈ S is reachable,
i.e., there is a sequence α ∈ A∗ such that s0 · α = s.
Lemma 1 A system M is IP-insecure iff there exist u ∈ D, q ∈ S, a ∈ A and
α ∈ A∗ such that
(i) ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α),
(ii) obsu(q · aα) 6= obsu(q · α), and
(iii) dom(a)
 ∩ {dom(c)|c ∈ alph(α)} = ∅.
Proof: Let a system M be IP-insecure. Then there exist u ∈ D, q ∈ S, a ∈ A
and α ∈ A such that ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α) and obsu(q ·aα) 6= obsu(q ·α).
We fix this domain u and choose q, a, α such that |α| is minimal for all choices
of q, a, α satisfying ipurgeu(aα) = ipurgeu(α) and obsu(q · aα) 6= obsu(q · α).
Assume that there exists b ∈ A such that α = βbβ′ for some β, β′ ∈ A∗ with
dom(a)  dom(b). We show that such an action b can’t exist by considering the
following three cases:
1. obsu(q · βbβ′) 6= obsu(q · ββ′): We set q′ = q · β, a′ = b and α′ = β′.
Then the condition ipurgeu(bβ
′) = ipurgeu(β
′) is satisfied and we could
choose q′, a′, α′ instead of q, a, α. This contradicts the minimal length of
α, since |α′| < |α|.
2. obsu(q · aβbβ′) 6= obsu(q · aββ′): We set q′ = q · aβ, a′ = b and α′ = β′.
With the same argument as in the previous case, we get a contradiction.
3. obsu(q · βbβ′) = obsu(q · ββ′) and obsu(q · aβbβ′) = obsu(q · aββ′): This
gives
obsu(q · ββ′) = obsu(q · βbβ′) 6= obsu(q · aβbβ′) = obsu(q · aββ′) .
We set q′ = q, a′ = b and α′ = ββ′. Again, the condition ipurgeu(ββ
′) =
ipurgeu(aββ
′) is satisfied. We get a contradiction since |α′| < |α|.

In fact, with nearly the same proof, one can show that, if the length of α is
minimal for all choices of q, a, α, then α = ipurgeu(α).
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3.2 Characterization of TA-security
We present a new characterization of TA-security that also makes precise its
relationship to IP-security. As seen earlier, the latter is concerned with the
question which actions an agent u may observe at all, hence ipurgeu(α) is
obtained from α by removing from α actions that should be “unobservable”
for u, provided that information only flows as specified by the security policy.
The definition of TA-security in [5] was motivated by the observation that the
security-relevant information that should be unobservable to some agents is not
just which actions appear at all, but also information about the order in which
certain actions are performed. This type of information-flow is not prohibited
by the definition of IP-security.
In this section we show that what separates the definition of IP-security
from that of TA-security is the question how much information is known about
execution orders of actions. TA-security can essentially be seen as IP-security
plus the requirement that an agent should only have access to “timing informa-
tion” (i.e., information about the order of the occurrence of actions) insofar as
permitted by the security policy.
To formalize this, we require a few technical definitions. The following def-
inition captures the situation in which an agent u should not have information
about the order in which certain actions are performed, although it may know
whether these actions have been performed, and how often.
Definition 6 (swappable) Let α, α′ ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A and u ∈ D. We write
αabα′ ↔swapu αbaα′ iff dom(a) ∩ dom(b) ∩ {u, dom(c)|c ∈ alph(abα′)} = ∅. In
this case, we call the actions a and b swappable in αabα′.
For any relation →, we define =→ as the reflexive closure of → and ∗→ as the
reflexive, transitive closure of →.
We will see later that Definition 6 captures exactly the issue mentioned
above: If αabα′ ↔swapu αbaα′, then the action sequences αabα′ and αbaα′ should
be indistinguishable for agent u, even though it is allowed to know whether
actions a and b have been performed. The reason why, intuitively, u should not
have access to this “timing information” is that only agents w ∈ dom(a) ∩
dom(b)

can directly observe whether a or b is performed first. If no agent
that can observe this information directly performs any action in α, then, after
performing α, the agent u should not have this information either (unless of
course, u is in the intersection.)
We call strings α, α′ ∈ A∗ order indistinguishable for u, and write α ≡oiu α′,
if α
∗↔swapu α′.
We note that the definition of swappable could be relaxed to also allow swaps
of actions a and b when the agents that observe both a and b only perform
actions in α that cannot be observed by u via the policy—however we will later
only apply these definitions to action sequences to which ipurge has already
been applied. We therefore use the above definition to simplify notation. The
following lemma shows that our definition correctly captures the above intuition.
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It states that information about the order of “swappable” operations are indeed
hidden from an agent by the definition of TA-security.
Lemma 2 Let u ∈ D, α, α′ ∈ A∗ with α↔swapu α′, then tau(α) = tau(α′).
Proof: Let be β, β′ ∈ A∗ and a, b ∈ A such that α = βabβ′ and α′ = βbaβ′. We
proceed with an induction on the length of β′. First we assume that βab↔swapu
βba and show for all u′ 6∈ dom(a)∩dom(b) that tau′(βab) = tau′(βba) holds.
Note that by definition of↔swapu we have u, dom(a), dom(b) 6∈ dom(a)∩dom(b).
Without loss of generality, assume that u′ ∈ dom(a)∪dom(b), since otherwise
tau′(βab) = tau′(β) = tau′(βba). Also without loss of generality assume that
u′ ∈ dom(a). Therefore dom(b) 6 dom(a) and dom(b) 6 u′. This gives
tau′(βab) = tau′(βa) = (tau′(β), tadom(a)(β), a)
= (tau′(βb), tadom(a)(βb), a) = tau′(βba) .
Assume that αc↔swapu α′c for some c ∈ A. And we assume that inductively, for
any agent u′ ∈ D:
If α↔swapu′ α′, then tau′(α) = tau′(α′) .
The definition of ↔swap gives
∅ =dom(a) ∩ dom(b) ∩ {u, dom(d)|d ∈ alph(abβ′c)}
=dom(a)
 ∩ dom(b) ∩ ({u, dom(d)|d ∈ alph(abβ′)}
∪ {dom(c), dom(d)|d ∈ alph(abβ′)})
=(dom(a)
 ∩ dom(b) ∩ {u, dom(d)|d ∈ alph(abβ′)})
∪ (dom(a) ∩ dom(b) ∩ {dom(c), dom(d)|d ∈ alph(abβ′)}) .
Therefore βabβ′ ↔swap
dom(c) βbaβ
′, and from the prerequisites we also know that
βabβ′ ↔swapu βbaβ′. Applying the induction hypothesis gives tau(α) = tau(α′)
and tadom(c)(α) = tadom(c)(α
′). If dom(c) 6 u the we get directly,
tau(αc) = tau(α) = tau(α
′) = tau(α′c) .
In the case of dom(c)  u we get:
tau(αc) = (tau(α), tadom(c)(α), c) = (tau(α
′), tadom(c)(α′), c) .

The following corollary combines the above result and the fact that TA-
security implies IP-security:
Corollary 1 Let be u ∈ D and α, α′ ∈ A∗ with ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu ipurgeu(α′),
then tau(α) = tau(α
′).
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Proof: From the definition of TA-security it follows (see also the proof of
Theorem 1 in the full version of [5]) that ipurgeu(α) = ipurgeu(α
′) implies
tau(α) = tau(α
′). The corollary now follows from this result and repeated ap-
plication of Lemma 2. 
We now state the result mentioned earlier: TA-security is, in a very precise
sense, IP-security plus the requirement that agents should not be able to distin-
guish between action sequences that are order indistinguishable. The following
theorem shows that the information that an agent is not permitted to have in
the definition of IP-security, in addition to information already forbidden to it
by IP-security, is exactly the information about the orders of actions that are
“swappable.”
Theorem 1 Let be u ∈ D and α, α′ ∈ A∗. Then tau(α) = tau(α′) if and only
if ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu ipurgeu(α′).
Proof: If ipurgeu(α) ≡oiu ipurgeu(α′), then tau(α) = tau(α′) follows from
Corollary 1.
For the other direction, assume that tau(α) = tau(α
′). Since ipurgeu(α) =
ipurgeu(α
′) implies tau(α) = tau(α′) (Corollary 1), we can without loss of
generality assume that α = ipurgeu(α) and α
′ = ipurgeu(α
′). We also assume
α 6= α′. Note that the number of occurrences of an action a in α is the same as
in α′. Let be α′′ ∈ A∗ such that α′′ ↔swapu α′ and α′′ has a common prefix with
α of maximal length among all α′′ with this property. We can write α = βaβ′
and α′′ = ββ′′ with β, β′, β′′ ∈ A∗, a ∈ A and aβ′ 6= β′′. We also assume
that the position of a in β′′ is the left-most position among all possible choices
of α′′. The β′′ is of the form γbaγ′ with γbaγ′ 6↔swapu γabγ′ and γ, γ′ ∈ A∗,
b ∈ A. Therefore there is some agent u′ ∈ sourcesu(γ′) with dom(a)  u′ and
dom(b)  u′. Therefore the tree tau′(βγba) is a subtree of tau(α′). Because of
the corresponding number of occurrences of a in α, the corresponding subtree
would be tau′(βa). But the number of occurrences of b in this two trees does
not match. This contradicts the assumption that α′ 6= α′′. 
The characterization obtained by the above theorem is now stated in the
following corollary:
Corollary 2 A system M is TA-secure if and only if it is IP-secure and for
every state q, every agent u, and every a, b ∈ A, α ∈ A∗, if a and b are swappable
in abα, then obsu(q · abα) = obsu(q · baα).
Proof: We first show that if a system is not TA-secure, then it violates the
condition. Theorem 1 says that for all action sequences α and α′ we have
tau(α) = tau(α
′) if and only if there exist actions α0, . . . , αn such that
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α
=↔irr α0 =↔irr . . . =↔irr αk
=↔swap αk+1 =↔swap . . . =↔swap αl
=↔irr αl+1 =↔irr . . . =↔irr αn =↔irr α′ .
For the converse, we assume that M is IP-secure and not TA-secure. Then
there exist traces α and α′ and a state q such that obsu(q · α) 6= obsu(q · α′),
and tau(α) = tau(α
′). Let α0, α1, . . . be the sequence of action sequences as
above. Since M is IP-secure, it follows that if αi ↔irr αi+1, then obsu(q · αi) =
obsu(q · αi+1). Therefore, the above implies that there are traces αi and αi+1
such that αi
=↔swap αi+1 and obsu(q · αi) 6= obsu(q · αi+1) as claimed.
Now assume that the system M is TA-secure. In [5], it was shown that
TA-security implies IP-security. It remains to prove that M satisfies the con-
dition of the corollary. If the condition is not satisfied, then there s a state
q, agent u, and actions a, b ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ such that a and b are swap-
pable in abα, and obsu(q · abα) 6= obsu(q · baα). Since Theorem 1 implies that
tau(abα) = tau(baα), it follows that the system is not TA-secure, a contradic-
tion. 
4 Unwindings
The characterizations discussed above provide the basis for complexity results
for each of the notions of security. In the case of P-security, IP-security and TA-
security, our complexity results are obtained by means of an appropriate notion
of unwinding. For P-security, this is the classical notion of unwinding for tran-
sitive policies, but for IP-security and TA-security, we develop, in this section,
novel notions of unwinding that we show to be both sound and complete. These
notions are of independent interest in that they provide proof methods that can
be applied to establish security (e.g., by use of theorem provers) even when the
decision procedures are inapplicable (e.g., because the system is infinite-state, or
beyond the practical scope of our decision procedures.) The complexity results
are given in the following section.
For the remainder of this section, we assume that all states of a system M
are reachable, noting that all our notions of security hold in M iff they hold in
the reachable part of M .
We first recall the notions of unwinding defined in [4]. Given a system M ,
an unwinding with repect to a policy  is a collection of equivalence relations
∼u on the set of states of M , for u ∈ D, satisfying the following conditions, for
all u ∈ D, a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S:
OCP: If s ∼u t then obsu(s) = obsu(t).
SCP: If s ∼u t then s · a ∼u t · a.
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LRP: If dom(a) 6 u then s ∼u s · a.
Rushby shows that, for transitive policies  (where all our notions of security
coincide [4, 5]), a system M is P-secure with respect to  iff there exists an
unwinding on M . In fact, this result applies even for intransitive policies, with
exactly the same proof.
Rushby also defines a weak unwinding with respect to a policy  to be a
similar collection of relations that satisfy OCP, LRP and the following weaker
version of SCP:
WSC: If s ∼u t and a ∈ A and s ∼dom(a) t then s · a ∼u t · a.
It is shown in [4] that if there exists a weak unwinding on a system M with
respect to , then M is IP-secure with respect to . Subsequently, it was
shown in [5] that the conclusion can be strengthened to TA-security of M , and
also that if M is TA-secure then there exists a weak unwinding on the unfolding
of M , a system that behaves exactly like M except that it records in the system
state the sequence of actions performed. However, it is not the case that there
is always a weak unwinding on the original state space of a TA-secure system.
4.1 An Unwinding for IP-security
We now define a new notion of unwinding that we show to be sound and complete
for IP-security.
We define an unwinding relation ∼vu on the states of the system M for every
pair of domains u, v ∈ D. The domain u takes the part of the observer. The
domain v corresponds to a domain whose actions are not supposed to directly
affect the observations of u. We say that the collection of equivalence relations
∼vu for u, v ∈ D is an IP-unwinding on M with respect to , if for all domains
u, v, states s, t of M , and actions a ∈ A, the following hold:
OCIP: If s ∼vu t then obsu(s) = obsu(t).
SCIP: If s ∼vu t and v 6 dom(a) then s · a ∼vu t · a.
LRIP: If v 6 u and dom(a) = v then s ∼vu s · a.
With this definition it is possible to give a full characterisation of IP-security.
Theorem 2 A system M is IP-secure iff there exists an IP-unwinding on M
with respect to .
Proof: We first prove the implication from left to right. Let M be an IP-secure
system. For u, v ∈ D, we define the following relation:
s ∼vu t iff ∀α ∈ {a ∈ A|v 6 dom(a)}∗ : obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α) .
We show that this collection of relations is an IP-unwinding on M with respect
to .
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Obviously, ∼vu is an equivalence relation. For any s, t ∈ S, OCIP is trivially
satisfied by taking the empty string for α. It is left to show that ∼vu satisfies
the conditions SCIP and LRIP.
For SCIP, let a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a). By definition of s ∼vu t we have, for
all α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6 dom(c)}∗, that obsu(s · α) = obsu(t · α). This implies that,
for all α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6 dom(c)}∗, we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα). Again by
definition, this gives s · a ∼vu t · a.
For LRIP we assume that v 6 u. Let s ∈ S and a ∈ A with dom(a) = v.
Since we assume that all states are reachable, there exists a sequence of actions
β such that s = s0 · β. Then by applying IP-security of M :
∀α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6 dom(c)}∗ : obsu(s · α) = obsu(s0 · βα)
= obsu(s0 · ipurgeu(βα))
= obsu(s0 · ipurgeu(βaα))
= obsu(s0 · βaα)
= obsu(s · aα) .
This shows that s ∼vu s · a.
For the other direction of this proof we assume that M is IP-insecure, and
show that there does not exist an IP-unwinding. By Lemma 1, there exists
a reachable state q ∈ S, u ∈ D, a ∈ A and α ∈ A∗ such that ipurgeu(aα) =
ipurgeu(α) and obsu(q·aα) 6= obsu(q·α) and dom(a)∩{dom(c)|c ∈ alph(α)} =
∅. Set v = dom(a) and let ∼vu an equivalence relation on S that satisfies SCIP
and LRIP. We derive a contradiction to OCIP, showing that no IP-unwinding
can exist. By LRIP we have q ∼vu q · a, since v 6 u. By applying SCIP multiple
times, we get q · α ∼vu q · aα. Since obsu(q · α) 6= obsu(q · aα), OCIP is not
satisfied. 
Note that the equivalence relations satisfying SCIP and LRIP form a sublat-
tice of P(S2). This gives the following corollary, that will form the basis for the
decision procedure for IP-security described in Section 5.2.
Corollary 3 Let M be a finite system and, for every u, v ∈ D, let ∼vu be the
smallest equivalence relation that satisfies SCIP and LRIP with respect to .
Then M is IP-secure with respect  to iff ∼vu satisfies OCIPfor every u, v ∈ D.
4.2 An unwinding for TA-security
Next, we characterize TA-security by means of a new notion of unwinding.
Define a TA-unwinding of system M with respect to policy  to be a col-
lection of equivalence relations ∼v,wu on the set of states of M , for every u ∈ D
and every v, w ∈ D with v 6= w, satisfying the following conditions, for all states
s, t ∈ S and actions a, b ∈ A:
OCTA: If s ∼v,wu t then obsu(s) = obsu(t).
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SCTA: If s ∼v,wu t and if a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a) then s · a ∼v,wu
t · a.
LRTA: If dom(a) = v and dom(b) = w and v 6 w and w 6 v, and either v 6 u
or w 6 u, then s · ab ∼v,wu s · ba.
(If there is just one domain, then the empty collection is taken to be a TA-
unwinding.) The following result characterises TA-security using this notion of
unwinding.
Theorem 3 A system M is TA-secure with respect to  iff M is IP-secure
with respect to  and there exists a TA-unwinding of M with respect to .
Proof: We first show the direction from left to right. Let system M be TA-se-
cure with respect to . It follows that M is IP-secure with respect to , so it
suffices to show that there exists a TA-unwinding with respect to . For this,
we define the following relation on the states of M , for u, v, w ∈ D with v 6= w:
s ∼v,wu t iff ∀α ∈ {a ∈ A|v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a)}∗ : obsu(s·α) = obsu(t·α) .
That the property OCTA is satisfied is immediate from the choice of α = .
To show SCTA, let s, t ∈ S with s ∼v,wu t and a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a)
or w 6 dom(a). By definition of s ∼v,wu t we have for all α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6
dom(c) or w 6 dom(c)}∗, that obsu(s ·α) = obsu(t ·α). This implies that for all
α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6 dom(c) or w 6 dom(c)}∗, we have obsu(s · aα) = obsu(t · aα).
Again by definition, this gives s · a ∼v,wu t · a.
For LRTA let a, b ∈ A with dom(a) = v and dom(b) = w and v 6 w, w 6 v
and v 6 u or w 6 u. Let s ∈ S. Since we assume that all states are reachable,
there exists β ∈ A∗ with s = s0 · β . For any α ∈ {c ∈ A|v 6 dom(c) or w 6
dom(c)}∗ we have
v ∩ w ∩ {u, dom(c) | c ∈ alph(abα)} = ∅ .
This shows that a and b are swappable in βabα. By Lemma 2, we have
tau(βabα) = tau(βbaα). Then by applying TA-security of M we get for any
such an α:
obsu(s · abα) = obsu(s0 · βabα) = obsu(s0 · βbaα) = obsu(s · baα)
This shows that s · ab ∼v,wu s · ba.
For the other direction of this proof we assume that M is ta-insecure, but IP-
secure, with respect to , and show that there does not exist a TA-unwinding
on M with respect to . From Corollary 2, it follows that there exists q ∈
S, u ∈ D, a, b,∈ A, α ∈ A∗ such that a and b are swappable in abα and
obsu(q · abα) 6= obsu(q · baα). It follows that v 6= w. We set v = dom(a) and
w = dom(b). We suppose that ∼v,wu is an equivalence relation on S that satisfies
SCTA and LRTA, and show that it cannot also satisfy OCTA.
Since a and b are swappable in abα it follows directly that v 6 w, w 6 v and
v 6 u or w 6 u. Therefore by LRTA, we have q·ab ∼v,wu q·ba. Since v 6 dom(c)
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or w 6 dom(c) for all c ∈ alph(α), it follows by SCTA that q · abα ∼v,wu q · baα.
Since obsu(q · abα) 6= obsu(q · baα), we obtain that OCTA is not satisfied. 
Note that by Theorem 2, the reference to IP-security may be replaced by
the existence of an IP-unwinding, giving a characterization of TA-security that
is stated entirely in terms of the existence of unwinding relations.
5 Complexity
In this section, we consider the complexity of algorithmic verification of the
notions we have discussed, in the case of finite state systems.
We show that three of these notions (P-security, IP-security, and TA-security)
are decidable, and in fact can be decided in polynomial time, and we prove that
TO-security and ITO-security are undecidable.
5.1 Complexity of P-security
The algorithm presented in Figure 9 checks P-security. The main idea of the
algorithm is to use the unwinding characterization of P-security, and compute
the minimal equivalence relations satisfying conditions SCP and LRP and check
that these satisfy OCP. The equivalence relations are represented as partitions of
the set S, using the disjoint-set data structure which provides functions Make-
Set, Union and Find, with low amortized cost per operation [11].
The set P maintains the pairs of states that result in a union step. To com-
pute a witness in the case of insecurity, the store data structure keeps track of
the justification for each union step. Every entry of store consists of three pairs
of the form (s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b). Such an entry is stored if a union is applied on s
and t in a step, where s is reached from s′ by an action (or the empty trace) a
and t is reached from t′ by b. Since a union is only applied if Find(s) 6= Find(t)
and after the union Find(s) = Find(t) holds, only at most one stored entry has
(s, t) as a first pair. If the union is performed on states with different obser-
vations, the system is insecure and the compute-witness procedure computes a
witness for insecurity, i.e., two runs that have the same purgeu value, but end
in states with different observations.
To reference different values of the Find function, we parameterize it with
the number of unions, done during each iteration of the outer foreach-loop, i.e.,
for a fixed value of domain u. The function Findi, for i ≥ 0, denotes the values
of Find after the i-th application of union during one iteration of the outer
foreach-loop. We call i a union-number (of this iteration).
Similarly, Pi denotes the set of pairs in P after the i-th application of union.
Note that P maintains this value until the line just before the next application
of union. The set P≤i =
⋃
j≤i Pj is the set of pairs inserted into P up to the
i-th union-number, including the pairs that are removed from P . Since P≤i is
a set of pairs of states, we will consider it as a binary relation on S.
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Algorithm 1: Decide P-security
1 foreach u ∈ D do
/* create a new partition */
2 foreach s ∈ S do
3 Make-Set(s) ;
4 let P be an empty list ;
5 let store be empty ;
/* apply LR conditions */
6 foreach s ∈ S do
7 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) 6 u do
8 if Find(s) 6= Find(s · a) then
9 add ((s · a, s), (s, s), (a, )) to store;
10 insert (s · a, s) into the list P ;
11 Union(s · a, s) ;
12 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(s) then
13 return compute-witness(s · a, s, , ) ;
/* apply SC conditions */
14 while P 6= ∅ do
15 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
16 foreach a ∈ A do
17 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
18 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
19 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
20 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
21 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
22 return compute-witness(s · a, t · a, , ) ;
23 return “secure”
Figure 9: An algorithm for P-security.
Procedure compute-witness(s, t, α, β)
1 if s = t then
2 find a shortest path γ from s0 to s ;
3 return (γα, γβ) ;
4 else
5 choose stored entry ((s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b)) ;
6 compute-witness(s′, t′, aα, bβ) ;
25
Define for all s, t ∈ S
s ∼obsu t iff obsu(s) = obsu(t) .
To refer to stages in the construction of the equivalence relation, define for
all union-numbers i and for all s, t ∈ S
s ∼Findi t iff Findi(s) = Findi(t)
s ∼SCi t iff s ∼Findi t and s · a ∼Findi t · a for all a ∈ A
Note that both relations are equivalence relations on S. Note also that these
relations are monotone in i, i.e., if s ∼Findi t then s ∼Findi+1 t and if s ∼SCi t then
s ∼SCi+1 t.
To show correctness of the algorithm, we will show that is sufficient to guar-
antee SCP and OCP for the pairs of states collected in P .
Lemma 3 Fix an iteration of the outer foreach-loop, and let i be a union-
number of this iteration. Then ∼Findi is the smallest equivalence relation on S
that includes P≤i.
Proof: By induction on i. For i = 0 we have Pi empty, so the smallest equiva-
lence relation is the identity relation, which is also the relation corresponding to
the initial value of Findi. At each union, the pairs inserted into P are exactly
those that are used by the union. Therefore, ∼Findi is the reflexive, symmetric,
transitive closure of P≤i. Hence, ∼Findi is the smallest equivalence relation on S
that includes P≤i. 
First, we show that the witness produced by the algorithm is correct.
Lemma 4 If the algorithm terminates with a witness (α, β), the analyzed sys-
tem is P-insecure and we have purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) and obsu(s0 · α) 6=
obsu(s0 · β), where u is the agent chosen by the outer foreach-loop in the itera-
tion where the compute-witness procedure is called.
Proof: The procedure compute-witness is called with two states as parameter
having different observations for an agent u. From these states, the compute-
witness procedure constructs two paths back to s0. From the stored values, it
follows that these paths only differ in actions a with dom(a) 6 u. Therefore,
we have purgeu(α) = purgeu(β). Hence the constructed paths α and β are a
witness for the insecurity of the system. 
The correctness of the algorithm follows from this Lemma, showing that the
converse holds, too.
Lemma 5 If the algorithm terminates with “secure”, the analyzed system is
P-secure.
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Proof: Consider one iteration of the outer foreach-loop, where some agent
u ∈ D is chosen. Let m be the last union-number after this iteration of the
outer foreach-loop. We will show that the unwinding conditions LRP, SCP and
OCP hold for ∼Findm . It is clear that after the foreach-loop starting in line 6
the LRP condition holds for ∼Findm , since for every s ∈ S and every a ∈ A with
dom(a) 6 u, we have s ∼Findm s · a.
After each union step, it is checked that the observations are equal for the
two merged states. Assuming inductively that the observations are all equal on
each of the two merged set of states, it follows that the observations are equal on
the merged set. Therefore, for every i ≤ m we have ∼Findi ⊆ ∼obsu . Moreover,
the relation ∼Findm satisfies OCP.
After this iteration of the outer foreach-loop, Pm is empty and therefore, we
have for every s, t ∈ S that if (s, t) ∈ P≤m, then s ∼Findm t and s · a ∼Findm t · a
for all actions a ∈ A. This is guaranteed by the foreach-loop in line 16 for every
pair taken out of P in the line above. Therefore P≤m ⊆ ∼SCm . Since ∼SCm is
an equivalence relation and since ∼Findm is the smallest equivalence relation that
contains P≤m, it follows that ∼Findm ⊆ ∼SCm . Therefore, ∼Findm satisfies SCP. 
The following Lemma shows the correctness of the compute-witness proce-
dure and gives a bound for its running time.
Lemma 6 The procedure compute-witness computes a witness in O(|S| · |A|).
Proof: First, we will show that the graph induced by the stored values is a di-
rected rooted tree. For every stored entry e of the form e = ((s, t), (s′, t′), (a, b))
consider the projections pi0(e) = (s, t), pi1(e) = (s
′, t′) and pi2(e) = (a, b).
For every union-number i, the graph of the stored values is Gi = (Vi, Ei)
with Vi = {pi0(e), pi1(e) | e is a stored entry up to the i-the union number} and
Ei = {(pi0(e), pi1(e)) | e is a stored entry up to the i-the union number}. We
will show by an induction on i, that the connected components of Gi are di-
rected rooted trees where all edges are oriented towards some root and all roots
are of the form (s, s) and that P≤i ⊆ Vi ⊆ P≤i∪{(s, s) | s ∈ S} holds. In the it-
erations of the loop for the LR-conditions, only edges of the form ((s, t), (s′, s′))
with s 6= t are inserted. Therefore the resulting graph consists of directed rooted
trees. In the iterations of the loop for the SC-conditions, if an edge of the form
e = ((s, t), (s′, t′) is inserted into Gi, then Findi(s) 6= Findi(t) and therefore
(s, t) 6∈ P≤i ∪ {(s, s) | s ∈ S} and by induction hypothesis, (s, t) 6∈ Vi. Since
(s′, t′) ∈ P≤i, the edge e connects a new vertex with a vertex from Vi. Therefore,
the resulting graph Gi+1 is again a directed rooted tree.
It follows that if the procedure compute-witness is called with some states
(s, t) ∈ P≤i then it finds a path to the unique root (s′, s′) of the connected
component of (s, t) within O(|S|). A shortest path from s′ to s0 can be found
in O(|S| · |A|). 
The running time of the whole algorithm can be analyzed as follows. Since
the union is only applied on states in different sets, for each u ∈ D, the total
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number of unions is bounded by |S|. Note, that the insertion into P is only
combined with a union step, therefore the sets of pairs inserted into P during
the whole run of the algorithm is bounded by |S|, too. Also, the number of
stored triple of pairs is the same as the number of unions, since for every pair
(s, t) the union is only applied at most once. The stored values provide a
function from the first to the second and third pair. The union-find operations
can be implemented so as to have an amortized cost of α(|S|), where α is
the very slow growing (effectively constant for practical purposes) “inverse” of
Ackermann’s function [11]. Thus, the running time of this algorithm is bounded
by O(|D| · |A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
5.2 Complexity of IP-security
An approach similar to that for P-security works in the case of IP-security,
based on the unwinding characterization of IP-security. The algorithm is given
in Figure 10.
The argument for correctness is similar to that for the algorithm for P-
security: the algorithm computes the minimal equivalence relations satisfying
SCIPand LRIP, and checks that these satisfy OCIP. The argument for the
SC conditions is similar to that of Lemma 4 and 5. The running time of the
algorithm for checking IP-security is O(|D|2 · |A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
5.3 Complexity of TA-security
The argument for correctness of the algorithm of Figure 11 is similar to that for
the algorithm for P-security: the algorithm computes the minimal equivalence
relations satisfying SCTAand LRTA, and checks that these satisfy OCTA. The
argument for the SC conditions is similar to that of Lemma 4 and 5. The
running time is O(|D|3 · |A| · |S| · α(|S|)).
5.4 Space Complexity and Symbolic Implementation for
P-security, IP-security and TA-security
The algorithms presented above for P-security, IP-security and TA-security all
require space linear in the size of the number of states of the system. Due the
“state space explosion” problem, i.e., the fact that the number of states of a
system grows exponentially with the number of state variables, the number of
states may be very large in practical examples. For each of these notions of
security, it is possible to trade off space for time, at the cost of introducing
nondeterminism. Instead of computing an explicit representation of the mini-
mal unwinding relation ∼ of the appropriate type, we search through a graph
in which the vertices are pairs of states (s, t) such that s ∼ t, and in which
edges correspond to one of the unwinding rules of type LR or SC. The search
begins at a vertex (s, s), where s is reachable state, and terminates and declares
“insecure” if a pair (s, t) is reached such that obsu(s) 6= obsu(t). The search
can be conducted using nondeterminism and terminated at depth |S|2 with a
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Algorithm 2: Decide IP-security
1 foreach u ∈ D do
2 foreach v ∈ D with v 6 u do
/* create a new partition */
3 foreach s ∈ S do
4 Make-Set(s) ;
5 let P be an empty list ;
6 let store be empty ;
/* apply LR conditions */
7 foreach s ∈ S do
8 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) = v do
9 if Find(s) 6= Find(s · a) then
10 add ((s · a, s), (s, s), (a, )) to store;
11 insert (s · a, s) into the list P ;
12 Union(s · a, s) ;
13 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(s) then
14 return compute-witness(s · a, s, , ) ;
/* apply SC conditions */
15 while P 6= ∅ do
16 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
17 foreach a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) do
18 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
19 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
20 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
21 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
22 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
23 return compute-witness(s · a, t · a, , ) ;
24 return “secure”
Figure 10: An algorithm for IP-security.
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Algorithm 3: Decide TA-security
1 Run the Algorithm for IP-security: if it returns ”secure”, then
2 foreach u ∈ D do
3 foreach v ∈ D do
4 foreach w ∈ D with w 6 v and v 6 w and w 6 u do
/* create a new partition */
5 foreach s ∈ S do
6 Make-Set(s) ;
7 let P be an empty list ;
8 let store be empty ;
/* apply LR conditions */
9 foreach s ∈ S do
10 foreach a ∈ A with dom(a) = v do
11 foreach b ∈ A with dom(b) = w do
12 if Find(s · ab) 6= Find(s · ba) then
13 add ((s · ab, s · ba), (s, s), (ab, ba)) to store;
14 insert (s · ab, s · ba) into the list P ;
15 Union(s · ab, s · ba) ;
16 if obsu(s · ab) 6= obsu(s · ba) then
17 return compute-witness(s · ab, s · ba, , ) ;
/* apply SC conditions */
18 while P 6= ∅ do
19 take a pair (s, t) out of P ;
20 foreach a ∈ A with v 6 dom(a) or w 6 dom(a) do
21 if Find(s · a) 6= Find(t · a) then
22 add ((s · a, t · a), (s, t), (a, a)) to store;
23 insert (s · a, t · a) into the list P ;
24 Union(s · a, t · a) ;
25 if obsu(s · a) 6= obsu(t · a) then
26 return compute-witness(s · a, t · a, , ) ;
27 return “secure”
Figure 11: An algorithm for TA-security.
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declaration of “secure” in the case that no such pair is found. This gives a
co-NLOGSPACE =NLOGSPACE algorithm. Since graph search trivially re-
duces to these problems, verification of all three security notions is complete for
nondeterministic logarithmic space.
Both the algorithms given above and the nondeterministic logarithmic space
approach rely on explicit representation of states. We note that, in practice,
an effective approach to deciding the three properties may be to instead use
symbolic representations of states and relations to represent the fixpoint com-
putation for the minimal relation on reachable states satisfying the SC and LR
type rules, following techniques well known from the model checking area [12],
and then to intersect with a symbolic representation of the complement of the
OC type rule and check for non-emptiness. The performance of this approach is
unpredictable in general, so comparison with the algorithms above is a matter
for experimental research.
5.5 TO-security
We now prove that TO-security is undecidable. The proof also shows that the
source of the undecidability does not lie in using complex policies, in fact the
problem remains undecidable for a very simple, small policy.
Theorem 4 It is undecidable whether M is TO-secure with respect to , even
for a fixed policy containing 4 domains.
Proof: We prove the undecidability of TO-security by a reduction from the
Post Correspondence Problem [13]. An instance of this problem consists of a pair
of sequences U = U1, . . . , Un and W = W1, . . . ,Wn of words over an alphabet
Σ with at least two letters. The problem PCP is the set of such pairs (U ,W)
such that there exists a sequence of indices i1, . . . , ik with 1 ≤ ij ≤ n for each
j = 1, . . . , k, such that Ui1 . . . Uik = Wi1 . . .Wik . We encode an instance of this
problem as a machineM(U ,W) for the (intransitive) policy for agents A,B,C,D
given by A  C, A  D, B  C and C  D, such that (U ,W) ∈ PCP iff
M(U ,W) is not TO-secure with respect to .
Intuitively, in the machine M(U ,W), agent A guesses a word over Σ, and
agent B chooses whether this word is to be compared to a sequence of Ui or
Wi, and guesses a sequence of indices used to make the comparison. Agent C
observes the indices guessed by B, and guesses when the word being constructed
is complete. Agent D observes nothing until C declares the end of the construc-
tion, and then observes whether the word guessed by A does in fact correspond
to the sequence of indices guessed by B. The definition of TO-secure will be
guaranteed to hold with respect to agents A,B and C, so the determination as
to whether M(U ,W) is TO-secure depends on how the observations of agent D
relate to the actions and observations of A and C. More precisely, M(U ,W)
has
1. states of the form (p, V, i, x), where
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(a) p ∈ {U,U ′,W} indicates whether the sequence of letters guessed by
A is to be compared with a sequence of Ui (when p ∈ {U,U ′}) or as
a sequence of Wi (when p = W ).
(b) V is either a word over Σ which is a prefix (possibly the empty word
) of one of the Ui or Wi, or >. Intuitively, this indicates a part of the
word guessed by A that will be compared to an index guessed by B.
The case of > represents that an inconsistency has been detected.1
(c) i ∈ {0, . . . , n} is either 0 (no activity so far) or the last index guessed
by B,
(d) x ∈ {0, 1} is used to represent the state of the computation, with 0
meaning ongoing and 1 meaning complete.
2. initial state (U, , 0, 0),
3. actions
(a) of A: an action a for each a ∈ Σ, corresponding to guessing the letter
a
(b) of B: an action w (corresponding to the selection of W ) plus an
action gi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (corresponding to a guess of the
index i)
(c) of C: an action end
(d) of D: none
The transition function is defined as follows. For all actions b and states s =
(p, V, i, x), if x = 1 then we will have step(s, b) = s, i.e., once the computation
has terminated, no action changes the state. We therefore confine the definitions
below to the case x = 0. We make use of two functions G : {U,U ′,W} → {U,W}
defined by G(U) = G(U ′) = U and G(W ) = W , and F : {U,U ′,W} → {U ′,W}
defined by F (U) = F (U ′) = U ′ and F (W ) = W .
In a state (p, V, i, x), the value G(p) captures the choice of U or W with
which to compare the word being generated by A. Intuitively, both p = U and
p = U ′ represent that the word being processed is to be compared with the U .
This the default, as indicated in the initial state. The reason for including U ′
is that agent B is given an opportunity to switch the system to comparing with
W only in the first step of a run. If it does not act, then the choice remains
with U for the remainder of the run.
In the case of action w, we define step((p, V, i, 0), w) = (W,V, i, 0) if p = U
and step((p, V, i, 0), w) = (p, V, i, 0) otherwise. This says that w switches the
choice of comparison to W. That the choice can be made only if w is the
initial action of a run is captured by defining all other actions b 6= w so that if
step((p, V, i, 0), b) = (p′, V ′, i′, x′) then p′ = F (p).
For the actions a of A, we define step((p, V, i, x), a) = (F (p), V ′, i, x), where
V ′ = V · a if V · a is a prefix of G(p)j for some j, and V ′ = > otherwise.
Intuitively, V is used to collect a fragment of the sequence being generated by
A for comparison with the G(p)j . We accumulate the fragment while it is a
prefix of such a string, and as soon as this is no longer the case we flag the
1Throughout, we use ⊥ to represent undetermined information and > to represent incon-
sistency.
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inconsistency.
For the actions gj of B, we define step((p, V, i, 0), gj) = (F (p), V
′, j, 0),
where
1. if G(p)j = V then V
′ = , and
2. if G(p)j 6= V then V ′ = >.
Intuitively, this captures that the effect of the action gj is to compare G(p)j
with the current fragment of the string being generated by A. If they are equal,
we reset V to  in order to check the next fragment. Otherwise, we flag the
inconsistency.
For the action end of C, we define step((p, V, i, 0), end) = (F (p), V ′, i, 1),
where
1. if V =  then V ′ = , and
2. if V 6=  then V ′ = >.
Intuitively, this action checks that the end is declared at a time when there is
no fragment currently being processed, and flags an inconsistency otherwise.
The observations are now defined as follows. The observations of A and B
are trivial: obsA(s) = obsB(s) = ⊥ for all states s. For C, we define
obsC((p, V, i, x)) =

i if V = 
> if V = >
⊥ otherwise.
Note that this means that for the initial state s0 we have obsC(s0) = 0. Intu-
itively, since i records the last (successful) guess of index for a fragment of the
word being generated by A, we have that C becomes aware of a guess whenever
it is correct, and can see from its observation ⊥ that a further fragment is in
the process of being constructed.
For D we define
obsD((p, V, i, x)) =

⊥ when x = 0,
G(p) when x = 1, and V =  and i 6= 0
> when x = 1 and either V 6=  or i = 0.
Intuitively, this means that D observes ⊥ until C declares the end of the string,
and learns whether U or V fragments were being checked when a decomposition
has been successfully guessed. Otherwise, it learns that the guesses do not
match. This completes the definition of the system M(U ,W).
We leave it to the reader to check that the conditions for TO-security are
satisfied in M(U ,W) for the agents u = A,B,C. For u = D, we claim that
the definition is violated iff there exists a sequence of indices i1, . . . ik such that
Ui1 . . . Uik = Wi1 . . .Wik . For, suppose that such a sequence exists. Define
α = Ui1gi1 . . . gik−1Uikgikend (1)
and
α′ = wWi1gi1 . . . gik−1Wikgikend. (2)
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Then we have purgeD(α) = Ui1 . . . Uikend = Wi1 . . .Wikend = purgeD(α
′).
Moreover, v  D and v 6= D iff v = A or v = C. If Ui1 . . . Uik is the sequence
of letters a1a2 . . . am, then tviewA(α) = ⊥a1⊥a2 . . .⊥am = tviewA(α′). Also,
we have tviewC(α) = 0⊥i1⊥i2 . . . ik⊥end = tviewC(α). However s0 · α =
(U ′, , ik, 1) and s0 ·α′ = (W, , ik, 1), so obsD(s0 ·α) = U 6= W = obsD(s0 ·α′).
Thus the condition for TO-security is violated.
Conversely, suppose that the condition for TO-security is violated. As noted
above, the violation can only occur for agent D. Let the witness be the sequences
of actions α, α′. Then we have purgeD(α) = purgeD(α
′) and tviewA(α) =
tviewA(α
′) and tviewC(α) = tviewC(α′) and obsD(s0 · α) 6= obsD(s0 · α′).
The action end must occur in at least one of these sequences, else we have
obsD(s0 · α) = obsD(s0 · α′) = ⊥, since only the action end can set x = 1.
Since tviewC(α) = tviewC(α
′), and the action end of C is recorded in its
possibly transmitted observations, it follows that end in fact occurs in both
sequences. Since no action changes the state after the occurrence of end, we may
assume without loss of generality that end is the final action in both sequences.
(Deleting any subsequent actions preserves the observations. Any actions of A
or C must occur in both, so their deletion maintains equality of purgeD and
tviewA and and tviewC . All other actions can be deleted without change to
purgeD, tviewA or tviewC .) Similarly, we may also assume that any occurrence
of w must be as the initial action in the sequence, since otherwise this action
changes nothing.
Since both sequences contain end we do not have obsD(s0 · α) = ⊥. Let
s0 · α = (p, V, i, 1) and suppose that obsD(s0 · α) = >. Then we have V 6=  or
i = 0. There are several possibilities. We show that each implies obsD(s0 ·α′) =
>, yielding a contradiction with obsD(s0 ·α) 6= obsD(s0 ·α′). The different cases
are:
1. If i = 0 then α contains no action gj , so tviewC(α) is 0end or 0⊥end.
Hence tviewC(α
′) also has this form, from which it follows that α′ also
contains no action gj , so obsD(s0 · α′) = >.
2. If V = > then at some stage of the computation either the current frag-
ment ceased to be a prefix of any G(p)j , or B guessed an index not match-
ing the current fragment. In either case, >must occur in tviewC(α), hence
in tviewC(α
′) also. This implies, by the definitions of obsC and obsD and
the fact that once V becomes > it remains >, that obsD(s0 · α′) = >.
3. Alternatively, if V ∈ Σ∗ \ , then tviewC(α) ends with ⊥end, hence also
tviewC(α
′) ends with ⊥end. This means that in α′ a fragment was under
construction when end occurred, hence if s0 · α′ = (p′, V ′, i′, 1) then we
have V ′ 6= , and hence obsD(s0 · α′) = >
It therefore follows that obsD(s0 ·α) and obsD(s0 ·α′) take (since they differ)
the values U and W . The sequences of the gj in α must be the same, since no
errors were detected in either computation, so for each occurrence gj we have
that j appears in tviewC . The last action before end in these sequences must
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be an action gj , else we end in a state (p, V, i, 1) with V 6=  or i = 0. It follows
that α and α′ have the forms in equations (1) and (2), and that (U ,W) ∈ PCP .

We note that the undecidability result for TO-security implies that there are
no simple unwinding conditions that are complete for this notion of security. In
particular, any first-order set of conditions on a collection of binary relations on
states can be checked in PTIME, hence cannot be both sound and complete.
5.6 ITO-security
A proof for the undecidability of ITO-security could be given that is similar to
that for TO-security. However, the result can also be obtained by noting that
the similarity of the two definitions allows for a reduction from TO-security
to ITO-security. The details of the reduction are given in the appendix. The
following result is then immediate from Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 It is undecidable to determine whether M is ITO-secure with re-
spect to , even for a fixed policy with 4 domains.
6 Related Work
The notion of noninterference was first proposed by Goguen and Meseguer [2].
Early work in this area was motivated by multi-level secure systems, and dealt
with partially ordered (hence transitive) information flow policies. The simplest
of these is the two-domain policy with domains L and H and L H, but not
H  L. Much of the literature is confined to this simple policy. Even with
this restriction, there exists a large set of proposed definitions of noninterference
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. These definitions generally agree when applied to determin-
istic systems, and the differences relate to how the definitions should behave on
nondeterministic systems. In addition to state-observed systems model used in
the present paper, a variety of systems models have been considered, including
action-observed systems, trace semantics, and process algebraic semantics (both
CCS and CSP flavours). A number of works have sought to classify the defini-
tions when formulated in a very general process algebraic setting [17], as well
as to establish formal relations between definitions cast in different semantic
models [9].
The main point of overlap of our work with this literature is to consider how
our results concerning P-security, when applied to transitive policies, relate to
other algorithmic verification approaches in the literature for such policies. Our
approach here is similar to other work in the area. In particular, the idea of
running two copies of the system in parallel, in order to compare two different
runs, has been used before [19]. Other approaches have been developed for au-
tomated verification of noninterference based on process algebraic bisimulation
techniques [17, 20]. Mantel [21] has characterised many of the existing defini-
tions of noninterference as compositions of a set of Basic Security Properties.
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The complexity of verifying these basic properties has been studied [22]. A
few works have considered richer systems models than finite state systems, e.g.
pushdown systems [23]. We note that our results in this paper, and in much
of the literature, is concerned with asynchronous systems in which agents are
unaware of the passage of time. Some of the literature deals with synchronous
systems, where a similar spectrum of definitions of noninterference exists for
nondeterminisitic systems. Some recent work has investigated verification of
synchronous notions of noninterference [24, 25].
Some work on development of tools based on decidable cases of such defi-
nitions of noninterference has been performed. Focardi et al. describe a tool
based on process algebraic techniques [26]. Whalen et al. [27] present an ap-
proach to model checking noninterference that is in use at Rockwell Collins for
verification of MILS systems. Their approach is a mix of model checking and
static analysis, in which a model checker is used to search through an enriched
version of the model in which labels computed by static analysis are associated
to systems components. They formally prove it to be sound with respect to a
definition of noninterference from work by Greve, Wilding and van Fleet [28].
While they discuss examples requiring intransitive policies, they leave details of
this for future work.
Since we have confined ourselves in this paper to deterministic systems, but
focus on richer intransitive policies, much of the work discussed above, which
is confined to transitive policies and nondeterministic systems, is orthogonal to
our concerns. Algorithmic verification of intransitive noninterference has had
less attention in the literature. After the work of Rushby [4], IP-security has
generally been taken to be the definition studied.
Pinsky [29] presents a PTIME procedure for deciding IP-security that, in
effect, generates a relation that is claimed to satisfy Rushby’s unwinding con-
ditions for transitive noninterference just when the system is secure. However,
in fact the relation may fail to satisfy the Output Consistency condition, so
this claim is incorrect. (Pinsky’s argument supporting the claim that the re-
lation satisfies Output Consistency, in the corollary to Theorem 2, states that
SA(basispi(z), α) is a subset of view(state action(z, α)). This is correct for
transitive policies, but could be false for intransitive policies.) That such an
approach cannot work for IP-security also follows from results in [5], where it
is shown that Rushby’s unwinding conditions are sound also for TA-security,
which is a stronger notion than IP-security. Moreover, an example in [5] shows
that a system may be TA-secure, but no Rushby unwinding exists on the sys-
tem (although one will exist on the infinite state unfolded system, when the
system satisfies TA-security). Thus, an approach based on finding a Rushby
unwinding, on the system as given, will also fail to be complete for the notion
of TA-security.
Hadj-Alouane et al. [30] also present a decision procedure for IP-security,
but it has complexity O(2|S|.2
|D|
), which is less efficient than our procedure by
two exponentials.
Roscoe and Goldsmith [10] have presented a critique of IP-security (arguing
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that it is too liberal in the information flows it permits), and have proposed two
alternate definitions cast in the process algebra CSP, based on what they call
lazy and mixed abstraction operators. It has been shown by van der Meyden
[31] that the definition based on lazy abstraction corresponds to P-security, and
the version based on mixed abstraction corresponds to ITO-security. Roscoe
and Goldsmith give an informal discussion, without precise complexity results
or proof, of algorithms for deciding “the generalised noninterference condition”.
Based on van der Meyden’s characterization of the definition based on the mixed
abstraction as as corresponding to ITO-security, we obtain that the definition
based on mixed abstraction is undecidable. It therefore seems that their com-
ments should be interpreted as concerned (like most of the preceding content in
their paper) just with the lazy abstraction based definition, and hence compa-
rable to our PTIME result for P-security.
Unwinding was introduced in [6] and given a crisp presentation in [4], for
both transitive and intransitive security policies. In particular, Rushy shows
that a notion of unwinding for transitive policies is both sound (if an unwinding
exists, then the system is secure) and complete (if the system is secure, then
there exists an unwinding). He also defines a notion of weak unwinding tailored
to intransitive security policies, and proves its soundness for IP-security, but not
completeness. The reason for this gap was identified in [5]: weak unwinding is
also sound for the strictly stronger notion of TA-security, so cannot be complete
for IP-security.
In a context of systems with local policies, sound and complete unwindings
are given in [32]. The unwindings for IP-security in this work are a special cases
of the unwindings given there.
Van der Meyden also shows that weak unwinding is complete for TA-security
in the sense that if a system M is TA-secure, then there exists a weak unwinding
on the system uf (M) obtained by unfolding M . The system uf (M) is essentially
the same as M , but with a new component added to states that records the
complete history of the system. The system uf (M) is bisimilar to M in a
appropriate sense of bisimilarity. It is generally held that two bisimilar systems
are equivalent with respect to all properties of interest. However, somewhat
unusually, the existence of a weak unwinding is not preserved by bisimilarity.
This means that, while unfolding and then searching for a weak unwinding is
a complete proof technique for TA-security, it falls short of providing a set of
unwinding conditions on the system as given. This is significant, in that the
existence of a first-order expressible set of such conditions would also yield a
decision procedure for TA-security of finite state systems. (The procedure would
be of at most nondeterministic polynomial-time complexity, involving guessing
an unwinding and verifying its properties.) By contrast, the process of unfolding
turns a finite state system into an infinite-state system, so a proof technique
that relies upon it does not trivially yield a decision procedure. Indeed, the
decidability of TA-security was an open problem until the present work.
In practice, definitions of the kind we have studied are very liberal in the
information flows that they permit: when a (source) domain acts, everything
that it knows (in some sense of knowledge) may be transmitted to any domain
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with which the source is permitted to interfere. In practice, one generally wants
to limit the information that flows from one domain to another to be just a
subset of the information available to the source. A framework for such policies
that generalizes the definitions studied in the present paper has been developed
by van der Meyden and Chong [33, 34].
Approaches to stating policies expressing such limitations have also been
developed in the context of language-based approaches to security, where they
are generally supported by means of sound but incomplete static analyses [35,
36, 37, 38, 39]. In the existing work, the policy is generally taken to be L H
with exceptions allowed to H 6 L, or more generally, a partial order with
exceptions. The system is given by a single, typically deterministic program,
and the focus is on relating initial values of input variables to final values of
output variables, rather than on what can be deduced from ongoing observations
in the state machine approach we have considered here.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have determined the computational complexity of verifying
whether a finite-state system satisfies an intransitive noninterference security
property. The polynomial-time upper bounds build on new characterizations
and unwindings for two of the notions of noninterference dealt with. They also
allow counterexamples (which can be used to improve the system in question)
to be found when the system is insecure.
We have considered only deterministic systems: there have been several
proposals to define intransitive noninterference in nondeterministic systems [40,
41, 10, 42, 43], the issue of complexity of these definitions remains open.
It would also be desirable to investigate algorithms and complexity for infor-
mation flow policies of the richer types studied in the literature on programming
languages approaches to declassification, in order to obtain sound and complete
approaches for such specifications. Since intransitive noninterference policies
provide a format for specifying architectural structure of a system, it would be
interesting to combine the strengths of the programming languages perspective
and the state machine model approach we have followed in this paper.
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Appendix: Reduction from TO-security to ITO-
security
We show that TO-security can be reduced to ITO-security.
First, we need some new definitions: For all u ∈ D and all α ∈ A, lpreu(α)
is the largest prefix of α that ends in an action a with dom(a) = u. (If there
is no such action, then we take lpreu(α) to be .) Similar to the definition of
tview, we define
ftviewu(α) = viewu(lpreu(α)) .
Now we can give a characterization of ITO-security, similar to the charac-
terization of TO-security in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 M is ITO-secure with respect to a policy  iff for all sequences
α, β ∈ A∗, and domains u ∈ D, if purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) and ftviewv(α) =
ftviewv(β) for all domains v 6= u such that v u, then obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 ·
β).
Proof: We first argue from left to right. We show by induction on the combined
length of α, β ∈ A∗ that, for u ∈ D, if we have purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) and
ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β) for all domains v 6= u with v  u, then itou(α) =
itou(β). Thus, if M is ITO-secure and the antecedent of the right hand side
holds, then so does the consequent obsu(s0 ·α) = obsu(s0 · β), by ITO-security.
The proof of the induction is trivial in the base case of α = β = . Suppose
that α = α′a where a ∈ A, and purgeu(α′a) = purgeu(β) and ftviewv(α′a) =
ftviewv(β) for all domains v 6= u with v u. We consider several cases.
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u. Then purgeu(α′) = purgeu(α′a) = purgeu(β), and
for v  u with v 6= u have v 6= dom(a), so ftviewu(α′) = ftviewu(α′a) =
ftviewu(β). By the induction hypothesis, itou(α
′) = itou(β). Since itou(α′a) =
itou(α) in this case, we obtain itou(α
′a) = itou(β).
Case 2: dom(a)  u. In this case, purgeu(α′)a = purgeu(α′a) = purgeu(β),
so β = β′b for some b ∈ A. In case dom(b) 6 u, we may apply Case 1 with the
roles of α and β swapped. We therefore assume without loss of generality that
dom(b)  u. Then purgeu(β) = purgeu(β′)b, and it follows that a = b and
purgeu(α
′) = purgeu(β
′).
Consider now v 6= u with v  u. In the case v 6= dom(a), we have
ftviewv(α
′) = ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β′b) = ftviewv(β′). In the case
that v = dom(a), we have ftviewv(α
′a) = viewv(α′a) and ftviewv(β′b) =
viewv(β
′b), so we obtain that viewv(α′a) = viewv(β′b), so also viewv(α′) =
viewv(β
′). The latter implies that ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(β′) in this case also.
It therefore follows by the induction hypothesis that itou(α
′) = itou(β′).
Thus, in case dom(a) 6= u, using what was shown above, we have
itou(α
′a) = (itou(α′), viewdom(a)(α′a), a)
= (itou(β
′), viewdom(a)(β′b), b)
= itou(β
′b).
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Similarly, in the case dom(a) = u, we have
itou(α
′a) = (itou(α′), viewdom(a)(α′), a)
= (itou(β
′), viewdom(a)(β′), b)
= itou(β
′b).
Thus, in either case we have itou(α) = itou(β), as claimed. This completes
the proof of the direction from left to right.
For the converse, define for each domain u, a function Pu and functions Fv,
all on the range of the function itou, by Pu() =  and Fv() = obsv(s0), and
Pu((x, y, a)) = Pu(x)a and
Fv((x, y, a)) =
{
y if dom(a) = v,
Fv(x) if dom(a) 6= v.
We claim that for all u, v ∈ D with u 6= v and v u, and all α ∈ A∗, we have
Pu(itou(α)) = purgeu(α) and Fv(itou(α)) = ftviewv(α). Now, if M is not
ITO-secure then there exist α, β ∈ A∗ and domain u with itou(α) = itou(β)
and obsu(s0 · α) 6= obsu(s0 · β). It follows from the claim that purgeu(α) =
purgeu(β) and ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β) for domains v 6= u with v  u, so
the right hand side of the proposition is also false.
The proof of the claim that Pu(itou(α)) = purgeu(α) is a straightforward
induction, left to the reader. For Fv(itou(α)) = ftviewv(α) we argue induc-
tively, as follows. The base case of α =  is trivial. For α = α′a, we consider
the following cases:
Case 1: dom(a) 6 u. In this case we have v 6= dom(a). Thus,
Fv(itou(α
′a)) = Fv(itou(α′))
= ftviewv(α
′) by induction,
= ftviewv(α
′a)
Case 2: dom(a)  u and dom(a) 6= u and v = dom(a). In this case
Fv(itou(α
′a)) = Fv((itou(α′), viewdom(a)(α′a), a))
= viewv(α
′a)
= ftviewv(α
′a)
Case 3: dom(a)  u and dom(a) 6= u and v 6= dom(a). In this case
Fv(itou(α
′a)) = Fv((itou(α′), viewdom(a)(α′a), a))
= Fv(itou(α
′))
= ftviewv(α
′) by induction
= ftviewv(α
′a)
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Case 4: dom(a) = u. In this case,
Fv(itou(α
′a)) = Fv((itou(α′), viewu(α′), a))
= Fv(itou(α
′)) since v 6= dom(a)
= ftviewv(α
′) by induction
= ftviewv(α
′a) since v 6= dom(a)
This completes the proof of the claim. 
We now show to reduce TO-security to ITO-security. Given a system M ,
we construct a system M ′ such that M is TO-secure iff M ′ is ITO-secure.
The intuition for the construction is that ITO-security permits a faster flow of
information than TO-security. In particular, when action a, with dom(a) 
u and dom(a) 6= u, is performed after sequence α, ITO-security permits the
transmission of the information in the view viewdom(a)(αa), whereas TO-security
permits transmission only of the information in the shorter view viewdom(a)(α).
The reduction handles this by replacing the final observation obsu(s0 ·αa) made
by dom(a) by the uninformative observation ⊥. This makes the faster flow of
ITO-security, in the system M ′ equivalent to the slower flow of TO-security in
M .
More precisely, given a system M = 〈S, s0, A, step, obs, dom〉, we define a
new system M ′ = 〈S′, s′0, A′, step′, obs′, dom′〉 as follows. We define the set of
final actions Af = {af|a ∈ A}. For every such an action we have dom(af) =
dom(a). The idea underlying final actions is that, if an agent has performed one
of its final actions, all further actions of this agent are ignored by the system.
Therefore the system has to keep track of which agent has performed one of its
final actions. If an agent has performed one of its final actions, its observation
is set to ⊥ and will never change. More formally:
S′ = S × P(D)
s′0 = (s0, ∅)
A′ = A ∪Af
For any s ∈ S and U ⊆ D:
obs′u(s, U) =
{
obsu(s) if u 6∈ U
⊥ otherwise
For any s ∈ S, a ∈ A and U ⊆ D:
(s, U) · a =

(s · a, U) if dom(a) 6∈ U and a ∈ A
(s · b, U ∪ {dom(a)}) if dom(a) 6∈ U and a ∈ Af with a = bf
(s, U) if dom(a) ∈ U
For the functions view, tview, etc., we use the same notation in both systems.
The intended system will be clear from the context.
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Lemma 7 A system M is TO-secure with respect to a policy  iff the system
M ′ is ITO-secure with respect to the same policy .
Proof: We first show the implication from left to right. We begin by defining
a function that transfers between runs in the two systems, and prove several
of its properties. For an action a ∈ A′, we define a = a if a ∈ A and
a = b if a = bf ∈ Af. We define the function convertback: A′∗ → A∗ by
convertback() =  and
convertback(αa) =
{
convertback(α) if there is a final action of dom(a) in α
convertback(α) a if there is no final action of dom(a) in α.
This function convertback removes for each agent its actions performed after the
agent’s first final action. This first final action is replaced by the corresponding
action from A.
We observe, that we have for any α ∈ A′∗: If s′0 · α = (s, U) for some s ∈ S
and U ⊆ D, then s = s0 · convertback(α). This implies that for any u ∈ D and
any α ∈ A′∗ that does not contain a final action of u, we have
obsu(s0 · convertback(α)) = obs′u(s′0 · α) .
This also implies that for any u ∈ D and any α ∈ A′∗ that does not contain any
final action of u, we have
viewu(convertback(α)) = viewu(α) .
(Here the left hand side is computed in M and the right hand side in M ′.)
The argument for this is an induction on α. The claim is trivial in case α = .
Suppose α = α′a where a ∈ A, and α′a does not contain any final actions of u.
We consider several cases:
• Case 1: dom(a) = u. Then a is not final and α′ contains no final action of
u, so convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′)a, and
viewu(α
′a) = viewu(α′) a obs′u(s
′
0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) a obs′u(s
′
0 · α′a) by induction
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) a obsu(s0 · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) a obsu(s0 · convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′a)) .
• Case 2: dom(a) 6= u and there is no final action of dom(a) in α′. Then
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convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′)a, so
viewu(α
′a) = viewu(α′) ◦ obs′u(s′0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obs′u(s′0 · α′a) by induction
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obsu(s0 · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obsu(s0 · convertback(α′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′)a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′a)) .
• Case 3: dom(a) 6= u and there is a final action of dom(a) in α′. Then
convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′), so
viewu(α
′a) = viewu(α′) ◦ obs′u(s′0 · α′a)
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obs′u(s′0 · α′a) by induction
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obsu(s0 · convertback(α′a))
= viewu(convertback(α
′)) ◦ obsu(s0 · convertback(α′))
= viewu(convertback(α
′))
= viewu(convertback(α
′a)) .
This completes the proof that viewu(convertback(α)) = viewu(α). Plainly, this
implies that for any α, β ∈ A′∗ that do not contain any final action of u, we
have
viewu(convertback(α)) = viewu(convertback(β)) iff viewu(α) = viewu(β) .
We now claim that for any u ∈ D and any α, β ∈ A′∗ that do not contain
a final action of domain u, that if purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) and ftviewv(α) =
ftviewv(β) for all v 6= u, v u, then purgeu(convertback(α)) = purgeu(convertback(β))
and tviewv(convertback(α)) = tviewv(convertback(β)) for all v 6= u, v u.
We prove the claim by induction over the combined length of α and β. It is
clear that it holds for α = β = . Consider α = α′a and β, neither containing a
final action of domain u, such that purgeu(α
′a) = purgeu(β) and for all v 6= u,
v  u: ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β) and that the implication holds for strings
of shorter combined length. We consider several cases:
• Case 1: dom(a) 6 u. This gives
purgeu(α
′) = purgeu(α
′a) = purgeu(β)
and
ftviewv(α
′) = ftviewv(α′a) = ftviewv(β)
for all v 6= u, v u. By the induction hypothesis,
purgeu(convertback(α
′)) = purgeu(convertback(β))
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and
tviewv(convertback(α
′)) = tviewv(convertback(β))
for all v 6= u, v  u. If there is a final action of dom(a) in α′, then
convertback(α′a) = convertback(α′) and the claim for the pair α′a and β
is immediate. We assume in the following that there is no final action of
dom(a) in α′. Then, since dom(a) = dom(a) 6 u, we have
purgeu(convertback(α
′a)) = purgeu(convertback(α
′)a)
= purgeu(convertback(α
′))
= purgeu(convertback(β))
and for all v 6= u, v u:
tviewv(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewv(convertback(α′)a)
= tviewv(convertback(α
′))
= tviewv(convertback(β)) .
• Case 2: dom(a)  u. In this case we have purgeu(α′)a = purgeu(α′a) =
purgeu(β), so β = β
′b for some action b. If dom(b) 6 u, then we may
swap the roles of α and β and apply the previous case. Hence, without
loss of generality, dom(b)  u, and we have purgeu(β) = purgeu(β′)b. It
follows that a = b and purgeu(α
′) = purgeu(β
′). For all v 6= u, v  u
with v 6= dom(a) we have
ftviewv(α
′) = ftviewv(α′a)
= ftviewv(β
′a)
= ftviewv(β
′) .
If v = dom(a) then we have
viewv(α
′a) = ftviewv(α′a)
= ftviewv(β
′a)
= viewv(β
′a) .
This implies viewv(α
′) = viewv(β′) and therefore, ftviewv(α′) = ftviewv(β′).
Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
purgeu(convertback(α
′)) = purgeu(convertback(β
′))
and tviewv(convertback(α
′)) = tviewv(convertback(β′)) for all v 6= u,
v u.
If there is a final action of dom(a) in α′ then, by purgeu(α
′) = purgeu(β
′),
there is also a final action of dom(a) in β′, and we have convertback(α′a) =
convertback(α′) and convertback(β′a) = convertback(β′). The desired
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conclusion is then direct from the above inductive conclusion. Alternately,
if there is no final action of dom(a) in α′ then there is no final action of
dom(a) in β′. In this case, since dom(a) = dom(a)  u, we have
purgeu(convertback(α
′a)) = purgeu(convertback(α
′)a)
= purgeu(convertback(α
′))a
= purgeu(convertback(β
′))a
= purgeu(convertback(β
′)a)
= purgeu(convertback(β
′a)) .
Also, for all v 6= u, v u, in case dom(a) 6= v we have
tviewv(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewv(convertback(α′)a)
= tviewv(convertback(α
′))
= tviewv(convertback(β
′))
= tviewv(convertback(β
′)a)
= tviewv(convertback(β
′a)) .
In the case dom(a) = v we argue as follows. If a is not a final action, we
have
viewdom(a)(α
′a) = ftviewdom(a)(α′a)
= ftviewdom(a)(β
′a)
= viewdom(a)(β
′a) .
Since there is no final action of dom(a) in α′ or β′, and a is not final, there
is no final action of dom(a) in α′a or β′a, and therefore
viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = viewdom(a)(convertback(β′a)) ,
using the equivalence proved above. From this equation it follows that
tviewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewdom(a)(convertback(β′a)) .
In the case that a is a final action, we have
viewdom(a)(α
′)a⊥ = ftviewdom(a)(α′a)
= ftviewdom(a)(β
′a)
= viewdom(a)(β
′)a⊥ .
Therefore viewdom(a)(α
′) = viewdom(a)(β′). Since there is no final action of
dom(a) in α′ or β′, it follows using the equivalence proved above that
viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′)) = viewdom(a)(convertback(β′)) .
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Thus,
tviewdom(a)(convertback(α
′a)) = tviewdom(a)(convertback(α′) a)
= viewdom(a)(convertback(α
′)) a
= viewdom(a)(convertback(β
′)) a
= tviewdom(a)(convertback(β
′a)) .
This completes the proof of the claim.
We are now positioned to prove that if M is TO-secure then M ′ is ITO-
secure. We show the contrapositive. Suppose M ′ is not ITO-secure. By Propo-
sition 2, there exist α, β ∈ A′∗ and domain u such that purgeu(α) = purgeu(β)
and ftviewv(α) = ftviewv(β) for all domains v 6= u such that v  u, and
obs′u(s
′
0 · α) 6= obs′u(s′0 · β). It follows from purgeu(α) = purgeu(β) that α
contains a final action of domain u iff β contains a final action of domain u.
But if both contain such a final action, then obs′u(s
′
0 · α) = ⊥ = obs′u(s′0 · β),
contrary to assumption. Thus neither α nor β contain a final action of u.
By what was shown above, purgeu(convertback(α)) = purgeu(convertback(β))
and ftviewv(convertback(α)) = ftviewv(convertback(β)) for all domains v 6= u
such that v  u. Also, obsu(s0 · convertback(α)) 6= obsu(s0 · convertback(β)).
By the characterization of TO-security of Proposition 1, this implies that M is
not TO-secure with respect to .
For the other direction of the proof we define a function convert : D×A∗ →
A∗, which, for each domain v 6= u with v u, replaces the rightmost action a
with dom(a) = v by the action af.
We observe that, for all u ∈ D, if γ, γ′ are prefixes of α and convertu(α),
respectively, and have the same length, then for all U ⊆ D, if s′0 · γ′ = (s, U)
then s = s0 · γ. Therefore, since convertu(α) contains no final action of domain
u, we have obsu(s0 · convertu(α)) = obsu(s0 · α). Moreover, if γ, γ′ are prefixes
of α and convertu(α), respectively, have the same length, and γ does not contain
the rightmost action of domain v in α (if any), then viewv(γ) = viewv(γ
′).
We show that, for all u ∈ D and all α, α′ ∈ A∗, if purgeu(α) = purgeu(α′)
and tviewv(α) = tviewv(α
′) for all v 6= u, v u, then purgeu(convertu(α)) =
purgeu(convertu(α
′)) and ftviewv(convertu(α)) = ftviewv(convertu(α′)) for
all v 6= u, v u. By an argument similar to that for the opposite direction, it
then follows that if M ′ is ITO-secure then M is TO-secure.
We observe that, for any agent u, the functions purgeu and convertu com-
mute. This shows that for all α, α′ ∈ A∗, if purgeu(α) = purgeu(α′) then,
purgeu(convertu(α)) = purgeu(convertu(α
′)).
To complete the argument, we assume purgeu(α) = purgeu(α
′) and for a
domain v 6= u with v  u, we have tviewv(α) = tviewv(α′), and show that
ftviewv(convertu(α)) = ftviewv(convertu(α
′)). From purgeu(α) = purgeu(α
′)
it follows that the sequences of actions of domain v in α and α′ are the same.
In particular, if neither sequence contains an action of domain v, then the claim
is trivial. Suppose that a is the last action of domain v in both α and α′. Then
we may write α = α1aα2 and α
′ = α′1aα
′
2, where α2, α
′
2 contain no actions of
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domain v. Since tviewv(α) = tviewv(α
′), we have viewv(α1) = viewv(α′1).
Also convertu(α) = γ1a
fγ2 and convertu(α
′) = γ′1a
fγ′2, where γ1, γ
′
1 are of the
same length as α1, α
′
1, respectively, and γ2, γ
′
2 contain no actions of domain v.
Thus, using the observation above,
ftviewv(convertu(α)) = ftviewv(γ1a
fγ2)
= viewv(γ1) a
f⊥
= viewv(α1) a
f⊥
= viewv(α
′
1) a
f⊥
= viewv(γ
′
1) a
f⊥
= ftviewv(convertu(α
′)) .

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